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Can electoral turnovers improve economic growth, governance, and democratic accountability across different political systems?

Key Findings:

• Electoral turnovers enhance national performance: Turnovers increase a general performance index (covering economic, human development, and democratic indicators) by 0.28 standard deviations. Gains are largest in trade intensity and macroeconomic discipline (such as inflation reduction). These effects are observed across regime types, including democracies, autocracies, and both presidential and parliamentary systems.
• Turnovers drive policy renewal and improved governance: Turnovers increase trade openness and policy responsiveness. Newly elected leaders introduce more policy change and reduce perceived corruption, even though they do not differ systematically in ideology or background from incumbents. Improvements compound over time, suggesting better governance dynamics rather than short-term effects.
• Executive replacement strengthens impact: When an electoral turnover results in a new executive leader (e.g., president or prime minister), the boost to country performance rises to 0.34 standard deviations. These effects are especially strong in settings with weak checks and balances, where new leaders can implement more substantial policy changes.
• Democratic accountability drives gains more than leader quality: The study finds little evidence that challengers are of inherently higher quality. Instead, the benefits stem from increased effort by new leaders motivated by reputation-building and reelection concerns. Turnovers also reduce the risk of democratic backsliding, particularly by replacing long-serving incumbents. 

Impact and Relevance:

This paper reorients the discussion on electoral democracy by showing that power transitions induced by elections, not just democratization itself, are a primary driver of improved national performance. While previous research has linked democratic transitions to economic growth, this study highlights the importance of competitive elections that offer real prospects for incumbent replacement as a key mechanism for good governance.

The findings carry important policy implications. At a time when many democracies face erosion, the study offers robust empirical support for strengthening electoral integrity and ensuring competitive political environments. It underscores that institutional renewal through elections helps guard against corruption, policy stagnation, and democratic backsliding.

Finally, the results resonate with classical political theory: stability without change risks institutional sclerosis. By showing that peaceful, democratic leadership changes can deliver growth, better governance, and political renewal, this study reaffirms the promise of electoral democracy in both developing and advanced economies.