Edward Djerejian, a former United States ambassador to Syria and Israel, believes the current chaotic situation in the Middle East presents an opportunity for a “grand bargain” for peace and stability in the region. In a , he proposed a comprehensive diplomatic effort involving a ceasefire in Gaza, a two-state solution in Israel and Palestine, normalized relations between Israel and Arab states, and U.S.-Iran negotiations to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions in exchange for sanctions relief. But he argued that such a bargain will only be possible if the right political conditions are in place, including a new Israeli government without Benjamin Netanyahu, a new Palestinian government and a demilitarized Hamas, and a strong and sustained diplomatic effort by the Trump administration. We asked Djerejian, who is now a senior fellow with the Middle East Initiative at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at vlog, to explain why he sees opportunity in this moment when so many other diplomatic efforts for peace and stability in recent decades have failed.
Over the decades, there have been other conflict and crisis moments that experts said might create opportunities for what you call a “grand bargain”—a wider peace and stability framework in the Middle East. How is this situation different?
Edward Djerejian: The October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas on Israelis and Israel’s massive military retaliation has shifted the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East somewhat akin to the October 1973 war, when Israel was also caught by surprise. That war led to the peace treaty brokered by President Jimmy Carter between Israel and Egypt in 1979. While the historic context is obviously different today, I do believe that the consequences of October 7 can lead to opportunities for peace and stability in the Middle East. First, the Palestinian issue, which was considered by many to have become marginalized in the region, has resumed center stage. The price of normalization of relations between Arab states and Israel beyond the Abraham Accords has become much higher—namely, a credible path toward and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Therefore, the end game for future negotiations, at least from the Arab point of view and that of many other countries, has been reinstated. There is little talk now of “peace for peace” or “economic peace” but a reiteration of the basic concept of “land for peace.” So, there is a realization that after the situation in Gaza is stabilized there must be a return to the negotiating table.
Secondly, while Israel was caught on the back foot on October 7, it has succeeded in diminishing the so-called “Axis of Resistance” (Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis) and has, therefore, created opportunities for diplomacy. Finally, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and the new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa’s efforts to restore Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is a major development. Syria’s geopolitical influence in the Arab world should never be underestimated. If Sharaa is true to his word, establishing a government that is representative of Syria’s multi-confessional population and establishing relations with regional and international partners—including the United States as witnessed by President Trump’s meeting with Sharaa in Riyadh—can do much to improve the prospects for peace in the region. At the same time, the recent elections in Lebanon of a new president and prime minister have raised hopes that the government can regain sovereign control of its territory and diminish Hezbollah’s military and political influence. If this occurs in Lebanon, a neighboring state next to Israel along with Syria, it can raise the prospects for peace.
You write that the current direction of geopolitics in the Middle East is “a formula for continuing conflict, regional instability, and promoting more extremism and terrorism” that puts U.S. national interests at risk. What interests are at risk, and what are the potential consequences?
Djerejian: Peace and stability in the Middle East are a major national security interest of the United States. Every president since 1948 has had to focus on the region because of its geopolitical importance as a major crossroads between East and West, maintaining the free flow of oil and gas through the Straits of Hormuz, promoting major economic, financial and commercial interests, and enhancing effective bilateral relations with key countries in the region. Conflict management and resolution involving state and non-state actors and counterterrorism operations are an important component of United States policy to avoid regional instability and hostilities. The consequences of how things can go wrong are exemplified, in part, by our engagement in “forever wars,” such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, and by the rise and growth of extremist and terrorist groups that threaten not only the countries in the Middle East but the United States, as witnessed on 9/11.
“The price of normalization of relations between Arab states and Israel beyond the Abraham Accords has become much higher—namely, a credible path toward and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.”
The Netanyahu government says it plans to occupy a significant part of Gaza and relocate much of its population. You say only a “newly elected Israeli government” can take the necessary steps towards peace, including halting annexation and negotiating a two-state solution. How realistic are the prospects for near-term change in government in Israel? Would President Trump have to withdraw support from Netanyahu?
Djerejian: Netanyahu’s policy of “total victory” in Gaza has run its course. He has not outlined a post-Gaza policy and has stated only that his goal is the “demilitarization and de-radicalization” of Gaza. That is a tactic and not a strategy. His extremist right-wing coalition partners in government have openly stated that they are opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian state and that their goal is the annexation of the Palestinian territories that they call Judea and Samaria and that they consider to be their biblical right. Therefore, there can be no prospect of successful negotiations with such a government in power in Israel. Recent polls in Israel indicate that nearly 50% of Israelis do not believe Israel can achieve its war aims, 73% prefer to end the war, and 60% think Netanyahu should resign, especially given his prioritizing military operations over the release of the remaining Israeli hostages. That is why I think it is necessary for there to be elections in Israel that bring into office a government that is prepared to consider negotiations and a peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
And here I have no illusions. The Israeli body politic has shifted to the right, but we were able to engage with Likud leaders such as Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, and Ehud Olmert in peace initiatives. It is not unrealistic that another right-wing leader can do the same. And we are already witnessing some distance between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s policies. Trump has made clear he wants to see a durable ceasefire to end the war in Gaza, has established a direct channel to Hamas to obtain the release of the dual-national American hostage, and wants to see all the hostages released. He has also struck a separate deal with the Houthis to protect U.S. shipping in the Red Sea, met with the new leader of Syria Ahmad al-Sharaa, decided to drop U.S. sanctions on Syria, and, most significantly, has engaged in direct negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue. These are policy decisions that are not in full accord, to say the least, with Israel’s government under Netanyahu, that but show that Trump is capable of making hard decisions when he sees them to be in the United States’ interest.
Removing Hamas’ influence from Palestinian politics would also seem to be a prerequisite for a grand bargain. Do any signs pointing to that being possible?
Djerejian: As I state in my paper, there will have to be elections in Palestine that bring to power a new government that is not systemically corrupt, as is the current Palestinian Authority, and that is committed to state building, as was the government under former Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in 2007. It would be difficult to fully remove Hamas’ political influence, but to demilitarize Hamas and subjugate it as one of many Palestinian parties in a newly elected Palestinian government is feasible. In a recent statement, senior Hamas official Khalil al-Hayya conditioned Hamas’ willingness to demilitarize and join the Palestine Liberation Organization to form a unified government in the West Bank and Gaza on an independent Palestinian state being established. While this condition is putting the cart before the horse, it does indicate the possibility of getting Hamas’ participation in a newly elected Palestinian government if negotiations and credible steps were being taken toward a Palestinian state.
You say seizing the moment will require bold diplomacy by the Trump administration. What in Trump’s foreign policy portfolio gives you confidence he can rise to this occasion? Are the Abraham Accords a roadmap?
Djerejian: I think President Trump has a real opportunity to exert the United States’ leadership in the changing dynamics we are witnessing in the Middle East to steer the region away from conflict. He is a transactional president who is inherently averse to getting the United States engaged in foreign wars and whose policies are guided by his “America First” doctrine. In his speech at the U.S.-Saudi Investment Forum in Saudi Arabia, he stated, “My job is to defend America and to promote the fundamental interests of stability, prosperity, and peace.” He underscored the importance of countering extremism and terrorism and, where possible, seeking gradual reforms and not “sudden intervention”—a clear reference to our military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq and neo-con nation-building policies. He stated that he will be meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Mahmoud Abbas to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace. Let us hope that this engagement will lead to positive results.
What incentive do the Iranians have to come to the negotiating table? And once they're there, what would they get in return for major concessions like giving up their nuclear programs and withdrawing support for proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis?
Djerejian: Sanctions relief, both primary and secondary, by the United States is a major incentive for Iran, whose economy is in serious difficulty with almost zero growth, high inflation, currency depreciation of over 50%, widespread poverty and inequality, and the negative effect of sanctions on Iran’s oil exports. Equally important is the prospect of Iran ending its international isolation and opening the prospects for diplomatic relations with the United States and enhancing its relations with regional and international partners. With the serious weakening of the Axis of Resistance, there is an opening here for diplomacy as evidenced by Trump’s direct engagement with Iran on the critical nuclear issue. This is a major reason why I think a grand bargain along the outlines of my policy paper is feasible with strong United States leadership.
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Banner image: This nighttime view of northern Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula was captured by the Expedition 49 crew aboard the International Space Station. The city of Cairo can be seen to the left at the top of the Nile river. Atop the sparsely lit Sinai Peninsula can be seen cities in Israel, including the brightly lit city of Tel Aviv on the Israeli coast along the Mediterranean sea. Photo by NASA Johnson
Edward Djerejian portrait: Photo by Martha Stewart