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And, perhaps most importantly, ordinary people in all 50 states are joining regular demonstrations and protests to defend our democratic institutions. We saw some beginnings on sporadic demonstrations against Elon Musk and DOGE at Tesla dealerships that spread. In April, the “50501” group and allied organizations organized protests in more than 1,400 locations around the country—and indeed around the world—that brought hundreds of thousands, perhaps more than a million, people into the streets. 

And, on the other side of the spectrum, some on the political right may be realizing that love for Donald Trump is not the same thing as love for American democracy. The abductions, detentions, and arbitrary treatment of immigrants who seem completely innocent of any serious crime such as Rümeysa Öztürk and Kilmar Abrego Garcia have rightly alarmed some Trump allies, including commentator Joe Rogan, about the importance of procedural checks on government power.

But it isn’t easy to oppose a determined government that is unconstrained by norms of respect for independence and dissent. Universities lose federal funding, clients leave law firms and their lawyers lose access, and news organizations get sued and perhaps regulators punish their businesses. Protesters can get investigated, arrested, and imprisoned. In the wake of the George Floyd demonstrations, Donald Trump is reported to have wanted to deploy military against protesters and suggested that perhaps troops could “shoot protesters in the legs.” But so far, the task of defending democracy has demanded less of us than many who came before us.

Will this multifaceted movement to defend American democracy grow and ultimately succeed? It may be close.

Archon Fung is the Winthrop Laflin McCormack Professor of Citizenship and Self-Government and the director of the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation

How Donald Trump is changing the media landscape

Nancy Gibbs

Just about every White House has had, shall we say, textured feelings towards the press: Teddy Roosevelt condemned Joseph Pulitzer as a man who “wantonly and wickedly and without one shadow of justice seeks to blacken the character of reputable private citizens and to convict the government… of wrongdoing of the basest and foulest kind, when he has not one shadow of justification of any sort.” President Obama pursued aggressive leak investigations. But as with so many other things, this White House has crashed through norms and wielded legal and financial threats to pressure the press corps in unprecedented ways. Targeting the Associated Press for its refusal to refer to the “Gulf of America,” or suing 60 Minutes for its editing of its Kamala Harris interview, were just the beginning. The White House briefing room is less a place to convey information and answer questions than to spar with reporters and enforce the message that correspondents are functionally enemies of the state.

As one of our most transparent presidents ever, Donald Trump made his motives clear when “You know why I do it? I do it to discredit you all and demean you all so that when you write negative stories about me no one will believe you.” This is not preventing reporters from doing hard-hitting investigative pieces on this administration, but given the headwinds facing mainstream media, the challenges are real and likely to grow. And as we saw during the 2024 campaign, this administration’s approach also reflects the rising importance of independent media—the YouTubers, podcasters, substackers, TikTok creators whose influence we are researching at the Shorenstein Center. In a splintered information environment, omni-platform, multi-directional messaging is a critical part of persuasive communication. So this president both reflects the shifts in the information landscape, and in some cases accelerates them.

Nancy Gibbs is the Lombard Director of the Shorenstein Center at ����vlog���� and the Edward R. Murrow Professor of the Practice of Press, Politics and Public Policy. She previously served as editor in chief of Time.

Expansive overreach and its effect on cities and civil society

Stephen Goldsmith

As a Republican former mayor and prosecutor, I believe that the most consequential action of the Trump administration during its first 100 days relates to its expansive use of federal power. Washington increasingly stretches or disregards the rule of law to force its will on local communities and private organizations, while deploying confrontational rhetoric and an aggressive federal administrative state. Rather than reinforcing the foundation upon which democratic governance relies, the administration frequently bypasses legal norms and institutional safeguards, severely weakening the trust that sustains civil society, especially in America’s cities.

Cities thrive on consistent legal frameworks and reliable government processes. When federal leadership undermines these norms through unilateral executive actions, unsanctioned agency closures, deportations of individuals lawfully in the U.S., and rhetoric that vilifies institutions from law firms to universities, it destabilizes the very systems that keep communities functioning. This disregard generates fear and disorder, making it harder for cities to deliver public services or ensure community safety.

The combination of overreach and blunt budget cuts harms our civic infrastructure.  Vulnerable residents, uncertain of their rights or security, retreat from public life, weakening the social cohesion necessary for thriving neighborhoods. Children are losing access to food and literacy support. Local governments, forced to respond to the fallout from erratic federal policies and sharp decreases in help for those most in need, see their resources strained and their ability to plan long-term eroded.

Efficiency should be gained by delayering bureaucracy, facilitating more digital solutions, removing unnecessary rules, and allowing more flexible direct state and local service delivery. However, by prioritizing disruption over discipline and bypassing congressional authorization or rule-of-law procedures, DOGE discredits the laudable cause of reengineering. Effective government cannot be built with a wrecking ball—it demands architectural reform rooted in standards, incentives, and cultural change. For example, eliminating the Interagency Council on Homelessness doesn’t make homelessness go away; it just makes deeply needed coordination on the problem go away. Likewise, deleting data sets on housing or the environment from federal websites doesn’t improve conditions, it just makes it more difficult for cities to deal with the consequences.

The erosion of legal norms doesn’t simply threaten constitutional order—it directly affects how cities operate, how residents engage with one another, and how civil society collaborates to solve shared problems. The Trump administration risks becoming an example of precisely the sort of government overreach it rails against.

When an administration flouts legal norms and uses the federal government's heavy hand, it doesn’t just risk backlash—it sabotages its own goals. Stable immigration policy? Safe streets? A reformed, leaner government? Intellectual diversity in education? Each requires deep institutional credibility and respect for due process and legal constraints.

Stephen Goldsmith is the Derek Bok Professor of the Practice of Urban Policy. Before Joining ����vlog����, Goldsmith served as deputy mayor of New York City and as mayor of Indianapolis.

Impacts on science and innovation that will be felt for decades

John P. Holdren

For 75 years, federally funded research in science and engineering has driven advances that, converted to practice by the private sector, have given this country the world’s strongest economy, most impressive medical technology, most robust environmental protection, and most capable military. Out of an evident deep-seated antipathy to science, data, and fact-aware decision making, however, the Trump administration has been seeking since inauguration day to substantially dismantle this engine of American well-being.

Led by the misnamed Department of Government Efficiency, the administration has slashed scores of programs, tens of thousands of staff, and tens of billions of dollars in budgets from the federal agencies with the largest responsibilities for both in-house and externally funded scientific research—National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, Department of Energy, Department of Defense, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, and Department of Agriculture. Even larger cuts are in prospect.

Programs and grants that deal in any way with diversity, equity, and inclusion, with the science of climate change and its impacts, and with renewable energy have been targeted with particular ruthlessness. Programs and offices addressing climate-related issues are being closed down at all of the agencies mentioned above, even to the point of rescinding in midstream external grants previously issued.

U.S. research universities, which use federal funding to perform the largest share of the country’s fundamental and biomedical research—as well as much of the climate-related science—are being hit hard, not only by the funding cuts but also by ideologically based attacks on their freedom of inquiry, their independent governance, their tax status, and their ability to enroll foreign students.

These wide-ranging, slashing attacks on science are not only causing immense immediate disruption in the lives of scientists, the economies of whole communities, and the progress of science and its applications nationally.  They are also already creating a brain drain of senior scientific talent out of the country, reducing arrivals of talented foreign students to study here, and discouraging American young people from pursuing careers in scientific and technical fields. These effects will be impacting progress in science and innovation in this country for decades.

John Holdren is a research professor at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and an emeritus professor in Harvard’s Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences and its School of Engineering and Applied Science. From 2009-2017, he was President Obama’s science advisor and the Senate-confirmed director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

Some direction, but no clear path, on the U.S.-China trade relationship

Rana Mitter

The Trump administration has placed some of the highest tariffs seen in recent decades on China: as of the 100th day, they stand at 145%. China has responded with tariffs of 125%. The outcome of this particular trade dispute will be crucial for the next decade or more of the relationship between the world’s two most powerful countries. The administration has signaled that it’s open to a deal, with the president declaring that he can see a “very nice” outcome, with the tariffs coming down “substantially.” China is not softening its language in response, however. It’s demanding that the tariffs come off before it’s willing to talk.

Still, it seems plausible that there will be an easing of tariffs on both sides, though it might take months not weeks. More crucial is the question of how the broader trade relationship between the two sides develops, particularly in areas of technological sensitivity. It’s just been announced that Apple will assemble all its iPhones for the U.S. market in India, not China, by 2026. Yet it will be much more of a challenge to move all the stages of production before final assembly out of China, where supply chains and technical expertise have been built up over decades. It’s not impossible that the U.S. could work with partners to move the center of tech production gravity out of China. But it will demand clearly defined goals that partners know won’t change unpredictably or at short notice. High tariffs on China might be a distraction from a wider policy that seeks to reposition the global centers of economic and technological gravity. The first 100 days has brought a direction of travel, but not yet clarity on the path or the end goal.

Rana Mitter is the S.T. Lee Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations. He is a historian and political scientist who studies China.

Transforming the world’s strongest economy into a chaos agent

Dani Rodrik

It was clear that tariffs would rise and the U.S. would become more protectionist during Donald Trump’s second term in office. But I don’t think many people quite anticipated the madness—and that is really the only word that can describe it—of Trump’s trade policies. It isn’t just that these tariffs targeted some of America’s closest allies and trade partners such as Canada and Mexico, countries with whom Trump had already negotiated a trade agreement during his first term. It isn’t just the arbitrariness of the tariffs: what possible purpose is served by a 50% “reciprocal” tariff on exports of jeans and diamonds from Lesotho, other than driving an already very poor country to ruin? It isn’t even the senseless heights to which tariffs have been raised: China faces tariffs of 145% on most products, and combined with pre-existing Biden-era tariffs, tariffs on Chinese exports of syringes are now an exorbitant 245%! Most damaging of all has been the confusion and turmoil generated by the incessant back-and-forth on tariffs, to the point that it is anyone’s guess what tariffs will be two months from now. The uncertainty is taking its toll on investment decisions, consumer sentiment, financial markets, and the U.S. dollar. In a few short months, Trump has managed to transform the world’s strongest performing economy into a machine sowing chaos.

Trump and his entourage have offered various reasons for their actions: bringing manufacturing back home, fixing the trade deficit, getting other nations to reduce their trade barriers, retaliating against unfair trade practices abroad, and many others. Leaving aside the realism and appropriateness of these objectives, it seems clear that the administration has chosen to address them in the worst possible way: using a very blunt instrument of unclear effectiveness (namely tariffs), without a clear plan or endgame, and by turning the rest of the world against the U.S. All that it has to show for its trade policies is mayhem at home and abroad.

Dani Rodrik is the Ford Foundation Professor of International Political Economy whose research focuses on economic development, international economics, and political economy.

Pushing the boundaries of presidential power

Maya Sen

There’s no question that Trump is approaching his second term very differently than he did his first. From the perspective of the rule of law, he has pushed the boundaries of presidential power in nearly every direction—and, in some cases, there is good reason to believe he has overstepped them.

Several examples illustrate this shift.

First, he has taken steps that encroach on powers the Constitution specifically grants to Congress. The best example is DOGE's efforts to gut administrative agencies established by Congress, such as USAID. The problem here is that, because many of these agencies were established through congressional statute, only Congress has the authority to eliminate them. At some point, the Supreme Court will intervene to determine whether Trump has exceeded his authority in gutting these agencies and firing federal employees—but by then, the damage may be irreparable. Rebuilding hollowed-out agencies is no small task. USAID is again a good example: no court can compel the return of experts and on-the-ground practitioners who have left, nor can it restore the dismantled international programs they once led.

Second, and relatedly, Trump has expanded emergency powers granted to the executive branch far beyond their intended scope, even in the absence of any obvious emergency. His use of tariffs illustrates this well. The Constitution gives Congress the power over tariffs, and while Congress has authorized the president to set tariffs during national emergencies, these emergency powers were never intended to be used to impose tariffs at a time when there is no tangible national security or urgent economic threat. Yet Trump has wielded them in precisely this way, attempting to levy tariffs even against historic allies and creating chaos in nearly all sectors of the economy. It would be hard to argue that this is what Congress intended when it gave the executive the power to set tariffs in times of national emergencies.

Third, and perhaps most troubling, Trump has gone to great lengths to coerce the behavior of private individuals and companies. As a scholar of the legal profession, I find his attacks on law firms especially alarming. The legal profession has long served as a cornerstone of our democracy, with American institutions recognizing the right to legal representation for all. Yet Trump has sought to punish law firms simply for the clients they have represented. In doing so, he is undermining the very concept of legal representation—something that cuts to the core of American democracy. Just as alarming, he has attempted to coerce law firms into agreements that bind them to provide legal assistance in support of the Trump administration’s favored causes—a move that could chill the independence of lawyers and advocates for years to come.

As Trump’s agenda increasingly clashes with the legal system, public opinion on these issues will be crucial. So far, polling suggests that many of these actions are deeply unpopular. Americans largely support the rule of law, and I am hopeful that this support will embolden more people, institutions, and companies to speak out on these important issues.

Maya Sen is a professor of public policy and political scientist whose interests include law, political economy, race and ethnic politics, and statistical methods.

An abrupt departure from a consensus on international development

Fatema Z. Sumar

In its first 100 days, the Trump administration unilaterally unseated the United States from its historic role as a global leader in international development. Through drastic funding cuts, the gutting of aid agencies, and policy paralysis, the administration precipitated a retreat from decades of bipartisan investment in poverty reduction, humanitarian assistance, and global health. The loss of American leadership, coupled with , has led to a massive crisis across the international development sector.

On his first day in office, President Trump froze billions in foreign aid funds and signaled his intent to severely scale back U.S. development programs in an . Key institutions like the (USAID) and the (MCC)—pillars of American soft power and instruments of global engagement—are now being dismantled and face existential threats. The cumulative effect is a collapse in many long-standing partnerships with governments, NGOs, and multilateral organizations around the world and a rapid contraction of the international development workforce. For instance, as of the end of April 2025, about due to the USAID stop work orders.

Plans to reorganize the U.S. or proposals to expand the scope of the (DFC) require congressional authorization and could face legislative and political hurdles before becoming reality. But they signal President Trump’s intent to engage in a more transactional U.S. foreign policy that views foreign aid as a tool to achieve U.S. security and commercial interests rather than reduce global poverty.

This shift marks an abrupt departure from a post-World War II consensus that positioned international development not only as a humanitarian imperative but also as a strategic instrument to create democratic and economically stable countries. The vacuum creates opportunities for other actors, particularly China, to expand their influence in regions where American leadership historically mattered most. The erosion of trust among partner countries, combined with the loss of technical expertise and institutional memory within U.S. aid agencies, will lead to lasting harm to America's credibility and operational capacity.

Fatema Z. Sumar is an adjunct lecturer in Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School and the Executive Director of the Harvard Center for International Development (CID). She served as the vice president of compact operations at the US Millennium Challenge Corporation and deputy assistant secretary of South and Central Asia at the U.S. Department of State.

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Faculty portraits by Martha Stewart and Ken Richardson.